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Abstract 
 
 Since early experimental explorations of pragmatic phenomena it has been 
documented that novel and established utterances are processed differently. This is 
especially relevant to processing of a class of utterances called ‘implicitures’ (Bach, 
1994)  in which some aspects of content are not explicitly expressed by the words 
used -- they are implicit. It has been suggested that at least some implicitures have 
become ‘standardized’ for their content (Bach, 1998; Garrett & Harnish, 2007). That 
is, the standard use of these expressions conveys the relevant content even though the 
words uttered do not present that content as conventional, linguistic meaning. While 
some studies suggest that the implicitures are mandatorily inferred regardless of 
context (Bach, 1998), others claim that impliciture processing is context-dependent 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986). We investigated this issue using spatial, temporal and 
possession implicitures in two reaction time experiments. Implicitures were presented 
context-free or embedded in contexts that either supported their preferred 
interpretation or cancelled it. The results indicated that implicitures are readily 
available when no context is provided and are produced even when context forces an 
alternative interpretation. These findings support a standardization view for at least 
some impliciture processing. Possible differences in processing mechanisms across 
theories of impliciture processing and across impliciture types are discussed.  
 
 
Keywords: Language pragmatics; implicitures; language in context; standardization; 
enriched meanings 
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1. Introduction 
 
 We sometimes mean almost exactly what we say (literally and directly), 
sometimes more than what we say (indirection and implicature), and sometimes we 
don’t mean what we say at all (nonliterality). It is often clear which category a 
particular utterance belongs to, but in many cases linguistic or psychological evidence 
must be brought to bear. One interesting and important class of overlapping cases 
goes by different labels: ‘generalized conversational implicatures’ (Grice, 1975), 
‘explicatures ’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), ‘enriched sayings’ (Recanati, 1993), 
‘implicitures’ (Bach, 1994), and ‘Q/I/M implicatures’ (Levinson, 2000). We adapt 
Bach’s term ‘impliciture’ to cover these cases because it conveys the central idea that 
in such utterances, what is directly meant is implicit in what is said and is not figured 
out subsequently. For example, the utterance ‘It’s raining’ typically involves a 
reference to local weather rather than weather at some other location. Furthermore, 
what is said as well as what is directly meant is closely connected to the words uttered 
and their syntactic structure (Grice, 1975). This distinguishes implicitures from 
traditional categories of conversational implicatures, indirect speech, and nonliteral 
utterances, originally investigated by Clark and Lucy (1975), Gibbs (1979) and 
Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos (1978).  
 Experimental research on implicitures asks how such implicit information is 
recovered during sentence processing. Different mechanisms have been proposed: 
Griceans postulated flouting Conversational Maxims, Sperber and Wilson proposed a 
Principle of Relevance, Bach proposed Standardized uses/meanings, and Levinson 
Default Heuristics. According to the relevance view (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) 
implicitures are only derived if favoured by context, so no interference would be 
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expected from an impliciture in a context favouring an alternative interpretation. In 
contrast, the standardization account (Bach, 1998) taking standardized uses as more 
salient than non-standardized uses (Garret & Harnish, 2007), suggested that the 
implied meaning is bound to sentence form and computed whenever an impliciture is 
encountered regardless of the context. Finally, according to the default view, implied 
content is computed when context does not restrict the interpretation but is suspended 
when the context forces an alternative (Levinson, 2000). 
Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002) used on-line reading times for  implicitures 
embedded as final sentences in short contexts to test three processing models derived 
from a default view, relevance theory and Gricean theory (not considered here). The 
contexts favoured either content close to sentence meaning, often called the 
“minimal” interpretation, or an enriched interpretation, the impliciture. The results 
showed speeded processing for contexts supporting the enriched meanings. This 
suggests processing that assigns priority to the impliciture regardless of context. 
Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002) presented this outcome (which they described in 
terms of a ‘ranked parallel model’) as compatible with a default view (Levinson, 
2000), but such interpretation is somewhat controversial given that Levinson 
postulates suspension of impliciture defaults in contexts supporting alternative 
interpretations.  This is perhaps due to two versions of the default theory being in play 
here, one (as exemplified by Bezuidenhout and Cutting’s treatment) that is not 
suspended by context and one (as exemplified in Levinson, 2000) that is. We will 
return to this issue in the discussion. 
Subsequent studies focusing on a specific subgroup of implicitures called 
‘scalars’ (e.g. ‘Some elephants have trunks’), have produced results that differ from 
those obtained by Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002). Truthfulness judgment reaction 
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time studies (Bott & Noveck, 2004) as well as reading time studies with scalars 
(Breheny, Katsos & Williams, 2006) showed that the implied meanings were not 
automatically derived in scalars, but were instead context dependent. This 
contradicting pattern of results has been attributed to differences in the impliciture 
types examined in the studies. The research supporting the relevance view (Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos & Williams, 2006) used only scalars,  while 
Bezuidenhuit and Cutting (2002), following Gibbs and Moise (1997), used impliciture 
types other than scalars and did not systematically distinguish among them.  
Here the distinction drawn by Garrett and Harnish (2009), following Levinson, 
between ‘Q-phenomena’ and ‘I-phenomena’ seems to be useful.  Levinson’s “Q-
Heuristic” applies to contrast sets (e.g., words like some < all’; ‘or < and’; ‘try <  
succeed’) which provide linguistic alternations that can direct ordered  inferences.  
The “I-Heuristic”, by contrast, refers to default inferences applied to utterances 
reporting stereotypical situations. Hence I-heuristic does not appeal to specific 
alternative expressions the way the Q-Heuristic does, but rather relies on ‘typical 
ways of reporting typical states of affairs’ and so has a far greater potential interaction 
with background knowledge. 
While some implicitures from Bezuidenhout and Cutting’s (2002) study, such 
as ‘It’s raining’, would fall into the I-phenomena category, scalars used in other 
studies would fall into the group of Q-phenomena.  Mechanisms underlying 
processing of these two categories of implicitures seem likely to differ precisely 
because of differences in their links to contextual constraint.  
Garrett and Harnish (2007) investigated a subclass of I-phenomena, involving 
examples such as locative (‘It’s raining’), temporal (‘I’ve had breakfast’) and 
possession (‘She flexed a leg’), each of which may have a minimal or enriched 
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impliciture interpretation.  Here the theoretical contrast was between the account of 
default heuristics with suspension and the proposal that meanings of implicitures in 
the I-phenomena category are derived based on standardized uses. Garrett and 
Harnish (2007) used two measures: reading time for implicitures and speeded 
response time to probe questions immediately following the impliciture. 
 When these sentences were presented context-free, there was a clear 
preference for their enriched interpretations. Furthermore, and essential to the 
contextual issues, these enriched interpretations interfered with impliciture processing 
when they were embedded in contexts favouring their minimal interpretations.  Those 
contexts did not suspend the inpliciture. This effect was observed for the question 
answering measure.  However, the reading time measure for the impliciture sentence 
did not reach significance, and hence there was no demonstration of an immediate 
clash between context and the standardized content for the impliciture.  Bezuidenhout 
and Cutting did find such an effect on reading time for the materials they tested. It is, 
therefore, important to evaluate this issue more robustly to better understand the time 
course of impliciture processing.  
The current study aimed to replicate and extend the previous investigation by 
Garrett and Harnish (2007) through refined experimental procedures and testing 
materials. The first experiment in Garrett and Harnish (2007) which tested for 
context-free interpretations of implicitures used auditory presentation of impliciture 
sentences while the second experiment with implicitures embedded in contexts relied 
on visual presentation of stimuli. To minimize possible discrepancies in findings 
arising from the modality differences, the current study used the visual reading mode 
only. The following experiments also included a more extensive item set and tested 
larger participants sample than the original study by Garrett & Harnish (2007). 
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Additionally, in the context of this study we also wish to highlight the distinctions 
between default, relevance and standardization theories of impliciture processing. 
Two experiments are reported. The purpose of the first experiment was to establish 
dominant interpretations of implicitures when context does not influence the meaning 
selection. The second experiment examined effects of context reading time, 
impliciture reading time and interpretation decision time for implicitures embedded in 
contexts supporting or canceling their implied meanings. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
This experiment assessed predictions of default views (Levinson, 2000) and 
standardization (Bach, 1998) by examining context-free interpretations of 
implicitures. Both approaches maintain that implicitures are computed automatically 
in these situations, and should thus be produced even when context cannot guide the 
interpretation. The position of the relevance account on this is not clear, perhaps 
context-free occurrences of implicitures would be considered ambiguous since 
context-dependent processes needed for inferring them are absent. This is because an 
utterance without strongly implicated premises is subject to application of a wide 
range of premises that are likely to vary across people (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 199-
200). 
 
2.1. Materials and methods 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
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The study, including the norming phase, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, was 
approved by the relevant research ethics body at the University of Arizona prior to its 
start. 40 native speakers of English (10 males, 30 females; average age 20, age range 
18-24), without history of language or learning disabilities participated in this 
experiment. Participants were undergraduates at the University of Arizona and 
received a course credit for their participation. At the beginning of each testing 
session, including norming, informed consent was obtained from each participant.  
 
2.1.2. Stimuli 
 
Norming phase: 
To ensure good quality of impliciture sentences to be used in Experiments 1 
and 2, eighty two impliciture candidates and their control sentences matched for 
length and structure were generated by the researchers and presented to a separate 
group of native speakers of English (undergraduates at the University of Arizona 
participating in the experiment for a course credit) in a paper and pencil task. The 
objective was to measure the interpretive bias for the impliciture content. Twenty four 
items out of the set were previously used by Garrett and Harnish (2007). Each 
sentence was followed by a question about the implied content and two possible 
answers -- an impliciture probe and a non-impliciture probe. Responses were scored 
as accurate if the impliciture probe was selected. Data from 14 participants with 
overall accuracy rates 80% or better were included in the final evaluations. Items with 
error rates higher than 20% were excluded, leading to a set of 60 implicitures and 
control sentences. This resulted in an accuracy rate of 95% in favour of the impliciture 
probe across the set of impliciture sentences. The selected items were further 
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evaluated in two additional pilot runs using a computer based speeded two-alternative 
forced choice task which followed the procedures of the main experiment. For this 
part of norming, data from 46 native speakers of English (undergraduates at the 
University of Arizona participating in the experiment for a course credit) with 
accuracy rates over 80% for impliciture candidates were included in the final 
analyses. Average bias for impliciture content across the full set of impliciture items 
in this timed task was 89.2%. As a result of this final phase of norming five items with 
lowest accuracy rates were replaced.  
 
 Final set of stimuli: 
 Based on the results of the norming phase, 60 impliciture sentences of three 
implicitures types (20 locative, 20 temporal, and 20 possession) were selected for the 
experiment. Additional 60 filler sentences of comparable length and structure without 
strongly implied meanings were included in the testing set (e.g., “It’s a beautiful 
butterfly.”). 24 filler items were also included to avoid strategic response bias. Each 
item was followed by a question word with impliciture and non-impliciture response 
displayed underneath (see Figure 1).  
 
[Fig. 1 inserted here] 
 
2.1.3. Procedure 
 
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen in a sound attenuated 
room and stimuli were presented visually on the computer screen. DMDX software 
was used in this and all other testing involving computer presentation of stimuli 
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(Forster & Forster, 2003). Participants were instructed to imagine the experimental 
sentences being uttered in a natural conversation. Presentation sequence for each item 
(outlined in Figure 1) started with the phrase ‘Somebody said:’ displayed for 500 ms. 
Subsequently, an impliciture sentence or a filler sentence was presented. After reading 
the sentence participants pressed a spacebar on a keyboard to advance to the question 
display. There they selected a response by pressing one of two keys with either the 
index finger or the middle finger of their right hand. Participants’ responses were 
recorded. This experiment took 20-25 min to complete. 
 
2.2. Results 
 
 Responses were scored as accurate if they matched the preferred interpretation 
determined in the norming phase. The average error rate for free-standing implicitures 
was 12% reflecting the average bias of 88% in favour of the impliciture probes. 
Participants made the highest number of errors on temporal implicitures and were 
most accurate on locative implicitures (see Table 1). The individual error rates ranged 
from 19% to 1 %. All error trials and reaction times below 200 ms, above 4000 ms 
and below or above two standard deviations from the mean were excluded from the 
reaction time analyses. A one-way within-subjects analysis of variance was conducted 
to test the accuracy differences across the three subtypes. The main-effect of 
impliciture type was significant (F(2,78) = 11.11, p < .001). The accuracy was highest 
for locative implicitures (93%) and lowest for temporals (83%). The average accuracy 
rate for possession implicitures was 89%.  
 
2.3. Discussion 
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 Results of this experiment replicated the findings by Garrett and Harnish 
(2007).  Using a visual paradigm and a larger set of items and with higher number of 
participants, we found that the preferred interpretations of locative, temporal and 
possession sentences involve implicitures when they are presented without context. 
This supports the predictions of default accounts (Levison, 2000) and the 
standardization theory (Bach, 1998) both of which suggest that the impliciture 
interpretation is computed mandatorily when a context does not restrict the 
interpretation. 
   
3. Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 1 established a benchmark for performance with context-free 
implicitures. The purpose of the second experiment was to investigate the availability 
of the dominant meanings when implicitures are embedded in short contexts. The 
contexts were constructed so that they either matched the contents of context-free 
implicitures (enabling contexts), or favoured an alternative interpretation of 
implicitures contradicting their context-free meanings (canceling contexts). 
Underlying processing was examined using three on-line measures – context reading 
time, impliciture reading time and decision reaction time. According to the relevance 
view (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), no differences in processing would be expected 
between implicitures embedded in enabling and canceling contexts. This is because 
meaning of impliciture sentences is determined by the context in which they are 
placed and evolves as individual lexical items are encountered. Similarly, the default 
with suspension view (Levinson, 2000) suggests that default heuristics producing the 
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implicitures will be suspended in contexts supporting an alternative interpretation and 
therefore, no difference between the enabling and canceling contexts would be 
expected. In contrast, the default without suspension theory (Bezuidenhout & Cutting, 
2002) and the standardization view (Bach, 1998) predict that the context-free 
preferred interpretations of implicitures will be inferred regardless of contexts in 
which they are placed. Thus a slowdown in processing would be expected when there 
is a mismatch between context meaning and impliciture meaning (as in the canceling 
condition).  
 
3.1. Materials and methods 
 
3.1.1. Participants 
 
 The same group of 40 young adults that participated in Experiment 1 was 
tested. 
 
3.1.2. Stimuli 
 
Norming Phase: 
Impliciture sentences used in Experiment 1 were now embedded in canceling 
and enabling contexts. Prior to Experiment 2 off-line as well as computer-based 
evaluations were used to ensure quality of the stimuli. Contexts were 40 to 70 words 
in length and each context pair was matched for length and complexity. Materials 
were divided into two counterbalanced files so that each participant was exposed to 
each impliciture only once. Participants selected an impliciture or a non-impliciture 
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probe based on their interpretation of each context. Data from 83 participants with 
error rates less than 10% was used in the off-line paper and pencil evaluation. In the 
computer-based norming, data from 67 participants with overall error rates below 
20% were included. All participants in the norming phase were undergraduates at the 
University of Arizona fulfilling a course requirement. Only contexts with error rates 
less than 10% were selected for Experiment 2 resulting in the final set of 120 contexts 
(60 enabling and 60 canceling) with 60 implicitures as final sentences. 
 
Final set of stimuli: The 60 context pairs selected in the norming phase were 
divided into two counterbalanced lists – each of the lists contained 20 locative, 20 
temporal and 20 possessive contexts, with half of the contexts in each type being 
canceling and half enabling (see examples in Figure 2). The contexts were pseudo-
randomly organized so that responses to the same impliciture group and button 
presses of the same type would not be immediately repeated more than three times. 
Each item was followed by a question word with an impliciture response and a non-
impliciture response displayed underneath. 
 
3.1.3. Procedure 
 
 All stimuli were presented visually on a computer screen in a self-paced 
reading paradigm. Participants had to press a keyboard key with their left hand to 
advance through the contexts line by line. The lines stayed on the screen until the final 
button press indicating that the last sentence in the context had been read. After that 
question display was presented where participants selected a response by pressing one 
of two keys either with the index finger or the middle finger of their right hand. Each 
Implied content and context 
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context consisted of nine lines and an impliciture was always displayed in the final 
line. Participants’ responses, in addition to their context reading times, impliciture 
reading times, and decision times, were recorded. The context reading time was 
measured as the average reading time per line for the first eight lines of the context up 
to the final impliciture sentence. The impliciture reading time was the interval from 
the display of the impliciture sentence in the last line until the button press after the 
sentence had been read. Decision time was measured from the onset of the question 
display with impliciture and non-impliciture probes until a response was selected by a 
button press. This experiment immediately followed Experiment 1 and took 25-30 
minutes to complete.  
 
[Fig. 2 inserted here] 
 
3.2. Results 
 
 The average error rate for implicitures embedded in contexts was 7%, with 
participants making more errors on canceling (12%) than enabling contexts (3%). The 
overall error rates for individual participants ranged from 19% to 0%. Interpretation 
success rates across context and implicitures types are summarized in Table 1.   
All error trials were excluded from reaction time analyses. In addition, reading 
time and decision time cut-offs of two standard deviations from the mean and also 
lower and higher cut-offs of 200 ms and 4000 ms were applied to the data. The 
outliers resulting from the cut-offs were excluded from the analyses. The reaction 
time and reading time results are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Implied content and context 
 15 
[Table 1 inserted here] 
 
[Table 2 inserted here] 
 
Context reading time: Two-way repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) with context type (Two levels: enabling and canceling) and impliciture 
type (Three levels: locative, temporal, possession) as factors were conducted. There 
was no significant effect for the context type factor. The main effect for impliciture 
type was significant (F1(2, 78) = 86.77, p < .001; F2(2, 38) = 3.86, p < .05) reflecting 
a gradient from fastest reading of contexts for locatives to slowest reading of contexts 
containing temporal implicitures. Interaction between the two factors was not 
significant (F1(2, 78) = .22, p < .80; F2(2, 38) = .03, p = .97). 
Impliciture reading time:  2 x 3 ANOVAs with the same factors of context 
type and impliciture type were conducted and revealed a marginally significant main 
effect of  context type by subjects and a significant effect by items (F1(1, 39) = 3.87, 
p = .056; F2(1, 19) = 5.36, p < .05). This reflected slower reading times for 
implicitures in canceling contexts than those in enabling contexts. The main effect of 
impliciture type was significant only in the subject analyses (F1(2, 78) = 16.16, p < 
.001; F2(2, 38) = 2.27, p = .12). Interaction between the two factors was marginally 
significant by subjects only (F1(2, 78) = 2.99, p < .056; F2(2, 38) = 2.21, p = .12). 
Separate t-tests exploring differences in reading times for the three types of 
implicitures in enabling and canceling contexts showed significant effects for 
temporals (t1(39) = 2.44, p < .01; t2(19) = .73, p = .24) and possession implicitures 
(t1(39) = 1.97, p < .05; t2(19) = 3.20, p < .01), but not locatives.  
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Decision reaction time: 2 x 3 ANOVAs with the factors of sentence type and 
impliciture type were calculated. There was a significant effect of context type (F1(1, 
39) = 22.77, p < .001; F2(1, 19) = 15.8, p < .01) with decisions to implicitures in 
enabling contexts being made significantly faster than to implicitures in canceling 
contexts. The main effect for impliciture type was also significant (F1(2, 78) = 46.70, 
p < .001; F2(2, 38) = 36.87, p < .0001). There was a significant interaction between 
the two factors (F1(2, 78) = 6.18, p < .01; F2(2, 38) = 4.05, p < .05). Separate t-tests 
conducted for context effects within impliciture subtypes revealed differences 
between locatives (t1(39) = 2.21, p < .05; t2(19) = 1.14, p = .27), temporals (t1(39) = 
4.81, p < .01; t2(19) = 4.89, p < .01) and possession implicitures (t1(39) = 2.29, p < 
.05; t2(19) = 1.23, p = .24). 
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
Results of Experiment 2 replicated findings obtained by Garrett and Harnish 
(2007) for decision reaction time in a visual paradigm -- participants took 
significantly longer to choose a probe for the context appropriate interpretation of 
implicitures in contexts forcing a non-enriched interpretation of an impliciture. In 
addition, the current experiment showed a significant effect in the same direction for 
sentence reading time; this latter comports with findings by Bezuidenhout and Cutting 
(2002). Further, there was no effect of context reading time. This result was expected 
provided that the enabling and canceling pairs of contexts were well matched on 
length and complexity. Overall, these measures of impliciture processing provide a 
consistent picture indicating a process that assigns enriched content to implicitures 
and does so even in contexts which are incompatible with that content. 
Implied content and context 
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4. General Discussion 
 
 The predictions of default account (Levison, 2000), relevance theory (Sperber 
& Wilson, 1986) and standardization account (Bach, 1998) were assessed in two 
experiments.  Experiment 1 found that spatial, temporal and possession implicitures 
have a dominant implied interpretation that is assigned when they are presented 
without context. This indicates that the impliciture is computed automatically without 
the necessity of contextual contribution. Such a result supports predictions of the 
standardization account and the default accounts, but does not distinguish between 
them.  
The second experiment tested whether these same implicitures are available 
even when context favours an alternative interpretation. Results of Experiment 2 
indicated that this indeed is the case: reading of the implicitures took longer in 
contexts contradicting the enriched meaning, and interpretation decisions were also 
slower in this condition. This finding is expected on the standardization account and 
on the processing model in Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002).  The default with 
suspension account, which is the original default view expressed in Levinson (2000), 
would on the other hand, predict the suspension mechanism to apply in the canceling 
contexts, resulting in the default not being computed. Since no delay would be 
expected in this case, the default with suspension account is not compatible with our 
results. 
A number of questions emerge as candidates for further research.  First, we 
note that Bezuidenhout and Cutting linked their model to a default perspective, but 
that model requires a ‘default’ that is invariably computed and not suspended by 
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context, hence not at all a default in Levinson’s terms. Thus, for both standardization 
and default sans suspenders, the outcome is driven by the form of the impliciture and 
its content is automatically enriched. The only difference between the two lies in the 
mechanism assumed, standardization or inference to a default value.  The available 
data does not distinguish those two possibilities. Experimental evaluation of these 
options might benefit from more precise time based measures such as event-related 
brain potentials that could potentially resolve the question of when enriched content 
becomes available. On the assumption that an inference represents an added 
processing step, it would appear later and/or demand additional processing resources 
as compared with standardization.   
 
In this context we should consider some indications that there may indeed be 
further processing differences within the set of exemplars that we have been labelling 
I-phenomena. Some of these may prove to be more akin to inferential processes, while 
others will better fit the mould of standardization.  In our experimental results, we 
found that the strength of the implied interpretations varied across the three 
impliciture types examined. Context-free, there was highest interpretive bias for 
locative implicitures and lowest for temporals. In context, interpretation of temporals 
embedded in canceling contexts resulted in slow-down on impliciture sentence 
reading and on interpretation decision times. But interference from interpretation of 
locatives was much less obvious, only significant for participant decision times. 
Possession implicitures were slowed by context interpretation when they were 
encountered in the context-final sentence, but did not cause a slow down on the 
interpretation decision time measure. These differences are only suggestive, of course, 
as they are post hoc observations. But, they do point to possible processing 
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differences between the impliciture subtypes in the I-phenomena group and such 
differences, if they prove to be systematic, may provide leverage for better dissecting 
underlying processing mechanisms. 
 
 A second class of questions asks how the results concerning I-phenomena 
relate to the better studied Q-phenomena (see examples 1 and 2) 
 
(1) Q-phenomena (Scalars) 
Some of the guests have left 
a. Minimal interpretation: Some of the guests have left, maybe all. 
b. Enriched interpretation: Some of the guests have left [but not all] 
 
(2) I-Phenomena 
I’ve had breakfast.  
a. Minimal interpretation: I’ve had breakfast sometime (minimal) 
b. Enriched interpretation: I’ve had breakfast [today] 
 
As Levinson points out, Q-phenomena have a meta-linguistic aspect that I-phenomena 
lack, due to the fact that Q-implicitures turn on the location of the word(s) on the 
relevant scale of words.  Nothing like this is true of I-phenomena. And Garrett and 
Harnish (2009) point out, as with standardization, the Q-impliciture choices are 
limited and tightly connected to the language.  Q-implicitures avoid resorting to 
general problem solving by appealing to a scale fixed in the language; the scale does 
for Q-impliciture what standardization does for standardized I-implicitures.  
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Finally, we should emphasize that further work in needed to establish how 
meanings become standardized. It has been suggested that repeated coupling of an 
expression with an impliciture in usage can lead to attachment of this meaning to the 
linguistic form (Bach and Harnish, 1979). But exact mechanisms of this process have 
not been examined closely so far. It is also not clear how the effects of standardization 
would differ in terms of cognitive processing from products of conventionality 
(Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin, 1982) and establishment of saliency of meanings 
(Giora, 1999). Distinctions among these terms need to be drawn and experimental 
studies examining how utterances become standardized, conventionalized or salient 
are needed. These issues are not only relevant to implicitures, but apply to processing 
of other kinds of non-literal or indirect pragmatic utterances such as standardized and 
novel metaphors. Therefore, close attention needs to be paid to standardization of 
utterances by future studies in order to advance explorations in the field of 
experimental pragmatics. 
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Table 1: 
Context compliance rates for implicitures embedded in enabling and canceling 
contexts in Experiment 2. 
 
Impliciture Context Type 
Type Enabling Canceling 
Locative 97 88 
   
Temporal 99 87 
   
Possession 96 90 
   
Overall 97 88 
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Table 2 
Experiment 2: Averages and differences (results in the enabling condition subtracted 
from results in the canceling condition) for context reading times per line, reading 
times of implicitures embedded as final sentences in contexts and decision reaction 
times for the impliciture/non-impliciture probes. 
 
  Context reading Impliciture reading Decision RT 
Context type  Difference  Difference  Difference 
Locative          
 Enabling 1074 19 959 -6 1077 71* 
 Canceling 1093  953  1148  
Temporal       
 Enabling 1223 21 1044 119** 1290 229** 
 Canceling 1244  1163  1519  
Possession       
 Enabling 1166 13 1068 65* 1204 115* 
  Canceling 1179   1133   1319  
Overall           
 Enabling 1154 25 1024 59* 1190 129* 
  Canceling 1179   1083   1319  
 * p < .05       
 ** p < .01       
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Fig. 1. Example of the stimulus presentation sequence in Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Somebody said, 
 
 
It’s raining. 
 
 
Where? 
HERE  THERE 
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Fig 2. Examples of enabling and canceling contexts in Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enabling context: 
 
Holiday travel: You are Eve 
Eve and her sister Ashley have boarded their airplane 
to Chicago and are waiting for departure. 
They are chatting about their flying experience. 
Eve says that she developed a mild flying phobia 
after a very bumpy flight to Las Vegas. 
Looking at the sky through the airplane window she adds 
that she is little anxious about the departure today because 
it is very cloudy.  
 
Where? 
HERE                    THERE 
 
Canceling context: 
 
Holiday travel: You are Eve 
Eve and her sister Ashley have boarded their airplane 
to Chicago and are waiting for the departure. 
They are chatting about their flying experience. 
Eve says that she developed a mild flying phobia 
after a very bumpy flight to Las Vegas. 
She adds that she is little anxious about the landing today 
because according to the forecast for Chicago 
it is very cloudy. 
 
Where? 
THERE                    HERE 
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Appendix A: Examples of implicitures used Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Locative implicitures: 
It’s raining. 
It’s a beautiful afternoon 
It’s dusty and smelly. 
It’s very quiet.  
It’s a calm and peaceful night. 
 
Temporal implicitures: 
I've had breakfast. 
I've overslept. 
I have had dessert. 
I’ve already had supper. 
I’ve baked a cake. 
 
Posession implicitures: 
She cautiously flexed a leg. 
She lifted a finger. 
He chipped a front tooth. 
He carefully inspected both hands. 
He tugged on an ear lobe. 
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